1 Introduction

By “epistemic modals,” I mean epistemic uses of modal words: adverbs like “necessarily,” “possibly,” and “probably,” adjectives like “necessary,” “possible,” and “probable,” and auxiliaries like “might,” “may,” “must,” and “could.” It is hard to say exactly what makes a word modal, or what makes a use of a modal epistemic, without begging the questions that will be our concern below, but some examples should get the idea across. If I say “Goldbach’s conjecture might be true, and it might be false,” I am not endorsing the Cartesian view that God could have made the truths of arithmetic come out differently. I make the claim not because I believe in the metaphysical contingency of mathematics, but because I know that Goldbach’s conjecture has not yet been proved or refuted. Similarly, if I say “Joe can’t be running,” I am not saying that

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Joe’s constitution prohibits him from running, or that Joe is essentially a non-runner, or that Joe isn’t allowed to run. My basis for making the claim may be nothing more than that I see Joe’s running shoes hanging on a hook.

Clearly, epistemic modals have something to do with knowledge. But knowledge presupposes a knower or knowers. So, one ought to ask, whose knowledge is relevant to the truth of claims made using epistemic modals?

It is tempting to answer: the speaker’s. On the resulting view, which I will call Solipsistic Contextualism, “Joe might be running” expresses a truth just in case what the speaker knows does not rule out that Joe is running, and “Joe must be running” expresses a truth just in case what the speaker knows rules out that Joe is not running. For present purposes, we can leave the notion of “ruling out” schematic: we need not decide, for instance, whether knowledge that $P$ rules out everything logically inconsistent with $P$. Our discussion of Solipsistic Contextualism and its variants will turn only on whose knowledge is at stake, not on what “ruling out” consists in. Hence we will regard theories that understand epistemic modals as quantifiers over “epistemically possible worlds” as versions of Solipsistic Contextualism, provided they take the relevant set of worlds (together with an ordering, perhaps) as determined by the speaker’s knowledge or evidence.¹

¹Solipsistic Contextualism is sometimes attributed to G. E. Moore (perhaps the first philosopher to clearly distinguish epistemic uses of modals from others) on the basis of passages like this one, from his *Commonplace Book*:

People in philosophy say: The props. that I’m not sitting down now, that I’m not male, that I’m dead, that I died before the murder of Julius Caesar, that I shall die before 12 to-night, are “logically possible”. But it’s not English to say, with this meaning: It’s possible that I’m not sitting down now etc.—*this* only means “It’s not certain that I am” or “I don’t know that I am”.

However, Moore did not accept the Solipsistic Contextualist analysis of “must.” He denied that “It must be that $P$” means the same as “It’s impossible that not-$P$” (188), on the grounds that it is appropriate to say the former only when one does not know directly (e.g. by seeing) that $P$. It seems that he also rejected the solipsistic view for “probably” (402).
Solipsistic Contextualism promises to explain two facts about epistemic modals that would otherwise seem quite puzzling. First, it explains why we are normally prepared to make claims using epistemic modals on the basis of our own ignorance. If someone asks me whether Joe is in Boston, it is generally okay for me to reply, “He might be,” unless I know that he is not. This is just what we should expect if the truth of “He might be” depends on what the speaker knows. It is not what we should expect if the truth of “He might be” depends in part on what others know, or on what one could come to know. As we will see in what follows, the more “objective” we make claims about epistemic modals, the larger the gap between the circumstances in which we are warranted in making them and the circumstances in which we actually do make them. There is certainly a close connection between our willingness to assert “For all I know, \( P \)” and our willingness to assert “It might be that \( P \).” Solipsistic Contextualism takes that connection to be truth-conditional equivalence.

Second, Solipsistic Contextualism beautifully explains why the following sentences sound paradoxical:

(1) Joe might be in Boston, but I know he isn’t.

(2) Joe might be in Boston, but he isn’t.

According to Solipsistic Contextualism, (1) is a contradiction: when the second conjunct expresses a truth, the first must express a falsehood. And, while (2) isn’t a contradiction—possibility had better not imply actuality!—it is pragmatically infelicitous, since in asserting that Joe isn’t in Boston, one represents oneself as knowing that he isn’t, contrary to what is conveyed by the first conjunct.²

However, there are serious problems with Solipsistic Contextualism. I won’t be

alone in pointing them out: most of them have been noticed already by nonsolipsistic contextualists and expressivists. But I think that the former have failed to appreciate how deep these problems are, while the latter have appreciated them but overreacted. As I will argue below, once the force of the objections to Solipsistic Contextualism have been properly appreciated, it becomes clear that there is no stable nonsolipsistic fix. Recognizing this, expressivists have abandoned the whole project of doing truth-conditional semantics for epistemic modals. But that is throwing the baby out with the bathwater: there is, as I will argue, a viable truth-theoretic semantics for epistemic modals, provided one is willing to entertain the idea that truth varies not just with the context in which a claim is made, but with the context in which it is assessed.

2 Against Solipsistic Contextualism

I’ll consider three arguments against Solipsistic Contextualism. All of them are facets of a single problem: Solipsistic Contextualism cannot explain why we take ourselves to be disagreeing with each other about what might be the case, even when we have very different bodies of background knowledge.

2.1 Third-person assessments

The first problem is that people don’t assess others’ epistemic modal claims in the way that they should if Solipsistic Contextualism were correct. They don’t take them to be equivalent to claims about what is ruled out by what the speaker knows at the time of utterance—even when it is clear to both parties that the speaker knows less than the assessor.
I’d like you to imagine yourself in two slightly different scenarios. I’ll ask a question about each; write down your answer.

First case: You overhear George and Sally talking in the coffee line. Sally says, “I don’t know anything that would rule out Joe’s being in Boston right now” (or perhaps, more colloquially, “For all I know, Joe’s in Boston”). You think to yourself: I know that Joe isn’t in Boston, because I just saw him an hour ago here in Berkeley. Question: Did Sally speak falsely?

Second case: Scene as before. Sally says, “Joe might be in Boston right now.” You think to yourself: Joe can’t be in Boston; I just saw him an hour ago here in Berkeley. Question: Did Sally speak falsely?

Did you answer “No” to the first question and “Yes” to the second? Of course we don’t have grounds for supposing that Sally spoke falsely in the first case: she was simply commenting on what she knew. In the second case, though, it seems quite natural to reject her claim as false on the basis of the same information.³

Of course, we must take care that we are rejecting Sally’s whole claim as false, and not just the (embedded) proposition that Joe is in Boston. Compare this dialogue:

“It’s rumored that you are leaving California.”

“That’s completely false!”

³This phenomenon was first called to my attention by a footnote in John Hawthorne’s book Knowledge and Lotteries: “[A]s far as I can tell, ordinary people evaluate present tense claims of epistemic modality as true or false by testing the claim against their own perspective. So, for example suppose Angela doesn’t know whether Bill is alive or dead. Angela says Bill might be dead. Cornelius knows Bill is alive. There is a tendency for Cornelius to say Angela is wrong. Yet, given Angela’s perspective, wasn’t it correct to say what she did? After all, when I say It might be that P and it might be that not P, knowing that Cornelius knows whether P, I do not naturally think that Cornelius knows that I said something false. There is a real puzzle here, I think, but this is not the place to pursue it further.” (Hawthorne 2004, 27 n. 68)
Here the point of the response is to reject the thing that is rumored, not the claim that it is rumored. Could something similar be said about our inclination to reject Sally’s claim?

We have ways of distinguishing between cases where the whole asserted content is being rejected and cases where the embedded proposition is being rejected. The easiest way is just to ask:

“Do you mean that it’s false that you’re leaving California, or that it’s false that that’s what’s rumored?”

“The former.”

So, since you are the protagonist in the two cases I described above, let me ask you. When you said (supposing you did) that Sally spoke falsely, did you mean that she spoke falsely in saying “Joe might be in Boston,” or just that it’s false that Joe is in Boston? It was the former, right? Perhaps there would be some ambiguity if you had assented to “That’s false.” But you assented to “Sally spoke falsely,” which clearly concerns what Sally asserted, not its embedded complement.

2.2 Retraction

If that’s not enough, try this test: Should Sally retract her assertion, or can she stand by it? Consider how odd it would be for your interlocutor in the rumor case to retract her assertion:

“It’s rumored that you are leaving California.”

“That’s completely false!”

“Okay, then, I was wrong. I take back what I said.”
Your interlocutor wasn’t wrong about anything and can quite reasonably let her assertion about what is rumored stand:

“What a relief! But that was the rumor.”

By contrast, it seems entirely natural for Sally to retract her assertion that Joe might be in Boston after she hears what George has to say:

“Joe might be in Boston.”

“No, he can’t be in Boston. I just saw him an hour ago in Berkeley.”

“Okay, then, scratch that. I was wrong.”

Indeed, it would be very odd for Sally not to retract her claim (explicitly or implicitly):

“Okay, then, he can’t be in Boston. But I still stand by what I said a second ago.”

It’s not plausible to say that the target of Sally’s retraction (the thing she takes herself to have been wrong about) is the embedded proposition—that Joe is in Boston—for she didn’t assert or believe that. It must, then, be the modal proposition she expressed by saying “Joe might be in Boston.”

It is important here to distinguish retracting an assertion from claiming that one ought not to have made it in the first place. To say that one was wrong in claiming that p is not to say that one was wrong to claim that p. Sometimes it is right to make a claim that turns out to have been wrong (false). For example, suppose that all of the evidence available to Holmes overwhelmingly supports the hypothesis that the butler is the murderer. Then he was not wrong to claim that the butler was the murderer, even if it turns out that he was wrong in so claiming. Not only was he right to claim that
butler was the murderer—following the evidence, as always—but he would have been wrong to withhold his view on the matter.

If you find it implausible that Sally would say “I was wrong” in the dialogue above, make sure you’re not interpreting her as saying “I was wrong to say that.” Of course she wasn’t wrong to say what she did. But what she said was wrong, and that is what she is acknowledging.

2.3 Arguments

Here is a third reason for rejecting Solipsistic Contextualism. It seems that we sometimes argue and disagree about epistemic modal claims. A conversation might center, for a time, on the question whether Joe might be in Boston. The issue is not whether Joe is in Boston; everyone present acknowledges that he might be in Berkeley, and so no one thinks that there are going to be grounds for asserting that he is in Boston. The point of the conversation is to settle whether he might be in Boston. Reasons are offered on both sides, disputes are resolved, and perhaps a consensus is reached.

It is crucial to such arguments that the participants take themselves to be contradicting each other when one says “It might be that $p$” and the other says “No, it can’t be that $p$.” Solipsistic Contextualism cannot make sense of this. For it holds that the first participant’s claim is about what she knows, while the second’s is about what he knows.

A (broadly) Solipsistic Contextualist might account for this data by taking epistemic modals to work the way “local” seems to work. If your brother in Anchorage says “I went to a local bar, the Moose’s Tooth,” you (in Berkeley) can reply: “That’s not local, it’s five miles away from you!” (meaning local to your brother). In the same
way, the Contextualist might say, epistemic modals can be used with reference to what someone else (say, one’s interlocutor) knows. This move would help make sense of perceived disagreement.

It would do so, however, by construing arguments about what might be the case as arguments about what some particular person knows at some particular time. But then we should expect them to be asymmetrical in a way that they are not, since the person in question has privileged access to what she believes, and this is relevant to what she knows. Arguments about what might be the case do not feel as if they are “centered on” a particular person in this way. Indeed, they feel like continuous arguments, with a single topic, even as the participants gain relevant knowledge through discussion. Solipsistic Contextualism cannot account for this.

2.4 Semantic blindness?

All I am doing here is calling attention to how we use epistemic modals in practice. The defender of Solipsistic Contextualist could always acknowledge these facts but dismiss them as misleading guides to the semantics of epistemic modals. Perhaps third parties who assess Jane’s claim mistakenly take her to have asserted what they would be asserting by saying “Joe might be in Boston.” Perhaps Jane, assessing her own past assertion, mistakenly takes it to have the content she would now express if she used the same sentence. And perhaps the parties to an argument about whether it’s possible that Joe is in Boston are mistakenly taking themselves to contradict each other, when in reality they are simply talking past each other.

But that’s a lot of error to impute to speakers. One wants some explanation of why speakers are systematically confused in this way, and why this confusion doesn’t
generalize to other cases that should be similar if Solipsistic Contextualism is correct. For example, if speakers are systematically blind to unobvious context sensitivity, why doesn’t the following dialogue seem natural?

“Joe is tall. In fact, he’s the tallest graduate student in our department.”

“No, he isn’t tall. He’s shorter than nearly every NBA player.”

“Okay, then, scratch that. I was wrong.”

One would also need to explain why the data that seems to support Solipsistic Contextualism (primarily data about when speakers take themselves to be warranted in making epistemic modal claims) should be taken so seriously, when the data about third-party assessments, retraction, and arguments are just thrown away. There is no clear reason to favor the “positive” data in this way. Quite the contrary, semantics is typically driven more by data about perceived incompatibilities and entailments than by data about when people are willing to accept sentences. I propose, then, to put this approach to defending Solipsistic Contextualism on the back burner, as a last resort should no alternative view prove viable.

3 Nonsolipsistic Contextualism

These problems with Solipsistic Contextualism are relatively well known. Indeed, practically no one who has staked out a serious position on the semantics of epistemic modals defends the view. It is very common, however, to suppose that the problems with Solipsistic Contextualism lie with its solipsism, and that the solution is to move towards a form of contextualism that is less solipsistic and less subjective. If “Joe

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4It appears that Stanley 2005, 128 does endorse it.
might be in Boston” doesn’t mean “For all I know, Joe is in Boston,” perhaps it means “For all we know, Joe is in Boston,” or “For all we know or could easily come to know, Joe is in Boston.” All of these can be thought of as variants on “What is known does not rule out Joe’s being in Boston,” with different glosses on “what is known.”

In this section, I will consider some different ways in which a contextualist might try to meet the objections we have considered by moving away from the strict Solipsistic Contextualist position. I hope to persuade you that these are all bandaids on a gaping wound. The fundamental problem with Solipsistic Contextualism lies with its Contextualism, not its Solipsism.

3.1 Widening the relevant community

According to Nonsolipsistic Contextualism, “Joe might be in Boston” expresses a truth just in case what the contextually relevant group knows does not rule out Joe’s being in Boston.5 There are complications about what it means to say that a group’s knowledge rules something out, but we will skip over these until section 3.3. There are also complications about how these truth conditions can be generated compositionally: these will be discussed further in sections 6 and 7, but for our purposes here we need not settle them. The important thing here is that we have replaced talk of the speaker’s knowledge with talk of the knowledge of a group picked out by features of the context of use (including, on most versions, the speaker’s intentions).

Nonsolipsistic Contextualism allows us to make sense of Sally’s retraction of her claim in light of George’s response, by supposing that the contextually relevant group includes not just Sally but all the parties to the conversation, George included. That would explain why when Sally learns that George knew things that precluded Joe’s

being in Boston, she regards her own claim as having been refuted. It would also vindicate George’s assessment of Sally’s claim as false. Finally, it would make it possible to understand how a group can argue about whether Joe might be in Boston. According to Nonsolipsistic Contextualism, the group is trying to come to a consensus about what its shared knowledge excludes and leaves open.

Moreover, Nonsolipsistic Contextualism can explain the paradoxical ring of sentences (1) and (2) just as well its Solipsistic cousin. For it is usually assumed that the speaker belongs to the contextually relevant group, and that the group counts as knowing if any member does. On these assumptions, if the speaker knows that Joe isn’t in Boston, then “Joe might be in Boston” cannot express a truth. It follows that (1) is a contradiction and that (2) is pragmatically infelicitous.

So far, the move away from solipsism seems well-motivated and plausible. The problem is that once we let data about third-party assessments and retraction motivate an expansion of the contextually relevant group to include more than just the speaker, there is no way to stop this machine. The same kind of arguments that motivate expanding the relevant group of knowers to include George (in our example above) will motivate expanding the relevant group of knowers to include anybody who will ever consider the claim.

Indeed, the problem can be seen in our very first example with Sally and George. When you overhear Sally telling George, “Joe might be in Boston,” you think to yourself “She has spoken falsely.” To make sense of this reaction, the Nonsolipsistic Contextualist will have to make the contextually relevant group of knowers include you, even though you are not part of the conversation, not known to Sally, and perhaps not even noticed by Sally. It seems, then, that we need to take Sally’s claim to concern not just what she and George know, but what anyone within earshot of their conversation
And why limit ourselves to earshot? It doesn’t matter much to our story that you are in the same room as Sally. You’d assess her claim the same way if you were thousands of miles away, listening through a wiretap. Indeed, it seems to me that it does not even matter whether you are listening to the wiretap live or reviewing a recording the next day—or the next year. To vindicate all these third-party assessments, the Nonsolipsistic Contextualist would have to extend the relevant group of knowers not just to those in earshot, but to all those who will one day hear of, read of, or perhaps even conjecture about, Sally’s claim. There’s no natural stopping point short of that.

Consideration of when speakers will retract their claims seems to point in the same direction. For it seems to me that the retraction data we considered in section 2.2 is just as robust when we replace George by a hidden eavesdropper. Suppose Sally says, “Joe might be in Boston,” and George replies, “Oh really? I didn’t know that.” At this point, Jane—who is hiding in the closet—emerges and says, “Joe can’t be in Boston; I just saw him down the hall.” It seems entirely natural for Sally to reply, “Oh, then I guess I was wrong. Thanks, Jane.” It would be bizarre for her to say, “Thanks for telling us, Jane. I guess Joe can’t be in Boston. Nonetheless, I stand by what I said a second ago.” Clearly Sally did not have Jane in mind when she made her claim. So if we’re going to make sense of these retractions, we must suppose that the force of Sally’s claim was something like: what we know—we who are or will be in a position to consider this claim—does not rule out Joe’s being in Boston.

The same point can be made by considering arguments about what might be the case. Suppose two research groups are investigating whether a certain species of snail

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6In that case it will be your knowledge relevant to Joe’s whereabouts on the day the recording was made that is relevant—but still your knowledge (not Sally’s), and your knowledge now.
can be found in Hawaii. Neither group knows of the other’s existence. One day they end up at the same bar. The first group overhears members of the second group arguing about whether it is “possible” that the snails exist on the big island, and they join the discussion. Although the two groups have different bodies of evidence, it does not intuitively seem that they are talking past each other when they argue. Nor does it seem as if the topic changes when the first group joins the discussion (from what was ruled out by the second group’s evidence to what is ruled out by both groups’ evidence). To accommodate these intuitions, the Nonsolipsistic Contextualist will have to take all the possibility claims made by both groups to concern what is ruled out by the collected evidence of everyone who is investigating the question (known or unknown)—for any of these investigators could show up at the bar, in principle.

To sum up: the arguments that motivate a move from the “for all I know” reading of epistemic modals to the “for all we know” reading also motivate extending the scope of “we” to include not just the participants in the conversation but eavesdroppers, no matter how well hidden or how distantly separated in time and space. “It is possible that \( p \)” becomes “\( p \) is not ruled out by what is known by anyone who will ever consider this claim.”

But this is something like a reductio ad absurdum of Nonsolipsistic Contextualism. For if this is what epistemic modals mean, then most ordinary uses of them are completely irresponsible. Surely Sally would not be warranted in asserting “Nothing known by me or by anyone who will ever consider this claim excludes Joe’s being in Boston.” Indeed, she may have good reason to deny this. But intuitively Sally is warranted in asserting that Joe might be in Boston; her assertion is a paradigm use of an epistemic modal.
3.2 Objective factors

Hacking 1967 has a somewhat different argument for the same conclusion, that widening the relevant group of knowers to include the speaker’s conversational partners will not suffice to save a contextualist semantics for epistemic modals:

Imagine a salvage crew searching for a ship that sank a long time ago. The mate of the salvage ship works from an old log, makes a mistake in his calculations, and concludes that the wreck may be in a certain bay. It is possible, he says, that the hulk is in these waters. No one knows anything to the contrary. But in fact, as it turns out later, it simply was not possible for the vessel to be in that bay; more careful examination of the log shows that the boat must have gone down at least 30 miles further south. The mate said something false when he said, “It is possible that we shall find the treasure here,” but the falsehood did not arise from what anyone actually knew at the time. (148)

Hacking concludes that the truth of epistemic modal claims must depend not just on what is known, but on objective features of the situation—here, the presence of relevant information in the log.

This is another way in which contextualism might go nonsolipsistic: instead of (or in addition to) widening the community of relevant epistemic agents, we can relax the strength of the relation these agents must stand in to the relevant facts. In addition to looking at what they know, we might look at what they could come to know through a “practicable investigation” (as Hacking puts it), or what is within their “epistemic reach” (as Egan, forthcoming, puts it). We might say that “it is possible that p” expresses a truth if what is within the speaker’s epistemic reach (or perhaps the epistemic...
reach of a contextually relevant group) does not rule out $p$. Similar ideas can be found in DeRose 1991, which talks of “relevant way[s] by which members of the relevant community can come to know,” and even in G. E Moore’s *Commonplace Book*.

On this view, the reason Sally speaks falsely when she says “Joe might be in Boston” is that she has within her “epistemic reach” facts that would have ruled out Joe’s being in Boston. A “practicable investigation”—simply asking those around her—would have settled the matter. That also explains why Sally retracts her assertion when she hears what George has to say. Finally, it explains how it is that a group of people can argue about “whether Joe might be in Boston” without talking past each other or constantly changing the subject as they learn new things. The real topic is whether the facts that are within the group’s “epistemic reach” suffice to rule out Joe’s being in Boston.

I am skeptical that speakers make any implicit distinction in their use of epistemic modals between “practicable” and “impracticable” investigations, or between what they can easily come to know and what they can come to know only with difficulty or by the cooperation of fate. For example, it seems correct to say that people who used to think that it was possible that there were even numbers greater than 2 and less than $10^{17}$ that were not the sum of two primes were wrong—since we have now verified computationally that there cannot be any such numbers—even though this computation was not a practicable investigation for them. Similarly, we will judge Sally’s claim false (on the basis of what we know) even if we are listening in remotely, so that Sally is unable to take advantage of our information about Joe’s whereabouts.

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7Moore writes: “Things which no-one in fact knows may be such that, owing to them, it is in fact likely or unlikely that $p$, provided they are such that the person who says $p$ is likely or unlikely easily might know, or which the speaker & his hearers couldn’t easily know or have known, is incompatible with $p$, doesn’t prevent its being true that $p$ is prob.” (Moore 1962, 402, emphasis added).
And Sally will retract her assertion that Joe might be in Boston just as surely if she finds an itinerary on the floor as she will in response to George’s intervention—even if her finding this scrap of paper is completely fortuitous and not the result of a “practicable investigation” or a contextually relevant “way of coming to know.”

Even leaving this worry aside, however, it seems to me that Hacking’s is the wrong fix. Consider his own salvage ship example. It seems perfectly reasonable for the mate to say:

(3) It’s possible that we shall find the treasure here, and it’s possible that we shall find it farther south. Let’s examine the log before we dive: maybe we can eliminate one of these locations.

In his second sentence, the mate is acknowledging the possibility that a “practicable investigation” will rule out one of the two possibilities. If Hacking is right, that is tantamount to acknowledging that one of the two conjuncts of the mate’s first sentence might be false. So if Hacking’s proposal is right, then the mate’s speech should sound as infelicitous as “Jane is in Boston and Al is in New York. Maybe Jane is not in Boston.” But it doesn’t; it is perfectly felicitous.

### 3.3 Distributed knowledge

A different way in which one might handle cases like Hacking’s, in which an epistemic modal claim seems to be false even though the proposition said to be possible is not ruled out by what anyone knows, is to appeal to distributed knowledge. We have been appealing, vaguely, to “what is known by a contextually relevant group $G$.” But what is it for a group $G$ to know that $p$? A variety of answers are possible:

*Universal knowledge*: Every member of $G$ knows that $p$
**Partial knowledge:** Some member of $G$ knows that $p$

**Common knowledge:** Every member of $G$ knows that $p$, and knows that the other members know that $p$, and that they know that the other members know that $p$, etc.

**Distributed knowledge:** $p$ is a consequence of the totality of facts known by various members of $G$.

Teller 1972 suggests that if we take epistemic modal claims to concern a group’s *distributed* knowledge, we can explain why claims of the form “It is possible that $p$” sometimes seem true even though no one in the speaker’s group is in a position to rule $p$ out.

Consider the unfortunate murder of McRich (Teller 1972, 310). Sleuth knows that McRich’s nephew was ten miles from the scene of the crime all evening, while Private Eye knows that the murder occurred between 7 and 8 p.m. Both believe that it’s possible that the nephew did it. When they compare notes, they realize that the nephew couldn’t be the murderer. Teller points out how natural it would be for them to concede that they were wrong before, and that it had only *seemed* possible that the nephew was the murderer. The explanation, on Teller’s view, is that the truth of their claims of epistemic possibility depends on what is known *distributively* by the two of them together, which rules out the possibility that the nephew is the murderer. “What we know,” in this sense, can include facts not known to any of us individually.  

Like broadening “epistemic reach,” appealing to distributed knowledge in the semantics for epistemic modals can make epistemic modal claims more “objective.” This helps account for the fact that we tend to assess them in light of information not pos-

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*Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies have also appealed to distributive knowledge in their recent (unpublished) work on epistemic modals.*

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sessed by the speaker or any members of the speaker’s group. The problem, as before, is that it threatens to make them too objective. Given that Sleuth and Private Eye both have reason to believe that the other has information he does not have, it would be rash for either to assert or believe that what is known distributively by them fails to rule out the nephew as murderer. So if Teller is right about epistemic modals, it should seem rash for either of them to assert or believe that it’s possible that the nephew did it. But it doesn’t seem rash. It seems perfectly appropriate.

3.4 The puzzle

All of the proposals we’ve considered in this section are attempts to keep the core contextualist idea of Solipsistic Contextualism—the idea that epistemic modals are contextually sensitive to what is known at the context of use—while dropping the implausible Solipsism. And all of them face the same basic problem. The less solipsistic the theory becomes, the harder it is to explain why speakers feel entitled to make the epistemic modal claims they do.

The problem is that we have two kinds of data, and they seem to point in different directions. If we attend to facts about when speakers take themselves to be warranted in asserting that something is “possible,” Solipsistic Contextualism looks like the right view. Unfortunately, it cannot account for the data about speakers’ assessments of epistemic modal claims—including self-assessments that prompt retraction—or for the nature of disputes about questions expressed using epistemic modals. We can account for these data by making our Contextualism less solipsistic, but then we can no longer account for the data that originally motivated Solipsistic Contextualism.

Nor does there seem to be any stable position that balances these two competing
desiderata. If we focus on *uptake* (third-party assessments, retractions, and disagreement), we are led to expand the relevant body of knowledge, seemingly without end. But if we focus on *production*, we are led to contract it (on pain of making ordinary, apparently reasonable assertions unwarranted). We are led to a kind of paradox: although the truth of a claim made using epistemic modals must depend somehow on what is known—that is what makes it “epistemic”—it does not seem to depend on any *particular* body of knowledge. And there is no way to account for this in the framework of contextualism, which requires that the relevant body of knowledge be determined by features of the context of use. The fundamental problem with Solipsistic Contextualism lies with its Contextualism, not its Solipsism.

### 4 Non-truth-conditional Approaches

If these arguments seem familiar, perhaps it’s because they’ve been made before. Consider how Price 1983 argues against truth-conditional treatments of “probably.” First, he points out that we do not treat claims about what is “probable” as claims about what is likely given the *speaker’s* evidence:

> If I disagree with your claim that it is probably going to snow, I am not disagreeing that given your evidence it is likely that this is so; but indicating what follows from my evidence. Indeed, I might *agree* that it is probably going to snow and yet think it false that this follows from your evidence.

(403)

He then notes that if we fix this problem by expanding the relevant body of evidence to include, say, evidence that is available in principle, we can no longer understand how speakers take themselves to be justified in making the probability judgements they do:
...consider the surgeon who says, ‘Your operation has probably been successful. We could find out for sure, but since the tests are painful and expensive, it is best to avoid them.’ The accessibility, in principle, of evidence which would override that on which the SP judgement is based, is here explicitly acknowledged. (405)

If we look at when speakers make “probably” claims, we are pushed towards a solipsistic semantics, while if we look at third-party assessments of such claims, we are pushed toward something more objective. The upshot is that there is no way of filling in the $X$ in “Given evidence $X$, it is probable that $q$” that would yield plausible truth conditions for the unqualified “It is probable that $q$.”

Price takes these arguments to be compelling reasons for the view that “probably” does not contribute to the propositional content of a speech act at all. His view is that “probably” contributes to the force of a speech act, not its content. Other philosophers and linguists have taken similar views about “possibly” and other epistemic modals. So it is worth considering whether such approaches might provide a satisfactory resolution to the problems scouted in the preceding two sections.

4.1 Epistemic modals as force modifiers

It would be misguided to ask how “speaking frankly” contributes to the truth conditions of

(4) Speaking frankly, she’s too good for him.

When (4) is used to make an assertion, what is asserted is simply that she’s too good for him. “Speaking frankly” does not contribute anything to the content of the assertion;

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9In later work (1994) he suggests that the speech act can be both an assertion that it might be that $p$—in some minimal sense of “assertion”—and a non-assertive expression of positive credence in $p$.  

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its role is rather to comment on the kind of speech act being made. We should not puzzle ourselves about when the proposition *that speaking frankly she’s too good for him* is true, because there is no such proposition.

Perhaps asking how epistemic modals affect truth conditions is equally misguided. We have assumed so far that Sally is making an assertion, and this assumption leads directly to questions about the truth conditions of her claim. But we need not understand her speech act as an assertion. Perhaps she is simply signalling her unwillingness to assert that Joe *isn’t* in Boston. As Hare argues, “We have a use for a way of volubly and loquaciously *not* making a certain statement; and perhaps there is one sense of ‘may’ in which it fulfils this function” (1967, 321). Or perhaps she is *perhapserting* the proposition *that Joe is in Boston*. Here a “perhapsertion” is a distinct kind of speech act, which we might understand as the expression of some minimal degree of credence, or advice not to ignore a possibility. If the linguistic role of epistemic modals is to signal that the speaker is making a perhapsertion, then we need not trouble ourselves about the contribution it makes to truth conditions.

Such views account quite well for our uses of (standalone) sentences involving epistemic modals, while allowing us to dodge the questions about the truth-conditional contribution of epistemic modals that we saw above to be so problematic. However, they leave us unequipped to deal with *embedded* uses of epistemic modals (for example, modals in the antecedents of conditionals). And in general, they make it difficult to explain interactions between epistemic modals and expressions that have a content-expressing role.
4.2 Interface problems

Although epistemic modals cannot be embedded as freely as many other kinds of expressions, they do exhibit semantically significant embedding under quantifiers, truth-functional connectives, conditionals, and attitude verbs and adjectives. In this they differ greatly from “speaking frankly,” which does not embed in these ways:

(5) (a) If it might be raining, we should bring umbrellas.

(b) #If speaking frankly she’s too good for him, she’ll realize this.

(6) (a) It’s not possible that Joe is in Boston.

(b) #It’s not the case that speaking frankly, Joe is in Boston.

(7) (a) Sally believes that it’s possible that Joe is in Boston.

(b) #Sally believes that speaking frankly, she’s too good for him.

The force modifier approach tells us nothing about the contribution made by “might” in (5a) or “possible” in (6a). It is clear that “might” in (5a) is not indicating that anything is being perhapserted. In typical uses of (5a), the whole conditional is being asserted full stop, and the antecedent is neither asserted nor perhapserted. (It’s perfectly coherent to say, “If P, then Q. But not P.”) There is clearly a difference between (5a) and

(8) If it is raining, we should bring umbrellas,

but the force-modifier account of “might” does not help us understand what it is, since “might” is not serving as a force modifier in (5a).

10In some cases, the data are equivocal. von Fintel and Iatridou 2003 argue that in many contexts epistemic modals must take wide scope over quantifiers. I’ll discuss embeddings under temporal modifiers and alethic modals in section 7, below.
Similarly, the force-modifier account of

(9) It's possible that Joe is in Boston

gives us no guidance whatsoever about the meaning of (6a). Clearly “possible” occurs here within the scope of the negation—(6a) does not mean the same thing as

(10) It’s possible that Joe is not in Boston

—but what sense can we make of the negation of a speech act?

Finally, in (7a), “possible” occurs in the description of the content of a cognitive state, not a speech act. Although it is fairly clear how we could leverage our understanding of the kind of speech act conventionally made by (9) into an understanding of (7a), this requires that we treat “believe” differently when its complement is modified by an epistemic modal than when it is not. (Roughly: when “believes” takes a complement clause in which an epistemic modal takes wide scope, it will attribute credence above some minimal threshold, while in other cases it will attribute full belief.) Similar modifications will be needed for other attitude verbs. This complicates the (already difficult) project of giving a compositional semantics for attitude verbs by undermining the neat division of labor between force (supplied by the attitude verb) and content (supplied by the complement clause).

An advocate of the force-modifier approach might be able to tell separate stories, like the story sketched above about attitude verbs, about how epistemic modals behave in all of these other embedded contexts. But the resulting account is bound to be ugly and complex. The beauty of truth-conditional semantics is that it provides a common currency that can be used to explain indefinitely many interaction effects in a simple and economical account. We should be prepared to accept a messy, non-truth-
conditional account of epistemic modals only if there is no truth-conditional account that explains the data.

4.3 Explaining retractions

In addition to these problems with embedded uses, the force-modifier approach has difficulty with the same retraction data that caused problems for contextualism. For, if the force-modifier view is right, why does Sally say “I was wrong” when George tells her about Joe’s whereabouts? None of the answers that are available on the force-modifier view seem to work:

1. *She believed that Joe was in Boston, and he wasn’t.* No, because she didn’t believe this.

2. *She had a minimal degree of credence that Joe was in Boston, and he wasn’t.* No, because there’s nothing “wrong” about having a minimal degree of credence in a proposition that turns out to be false. For example, it’s quite reasonable to have a minimal degree of credence in each of a number of incompatible alternatives, even though all but one of these are bound to be false.

3. *She had a minimal degree of credence that Joe was in Boston, and she shouldn’t have, given her evidence.* But she should have! *Her* evidence didn’t rule out his being in Boston.

4. *She raised to salience the possibility that Joe was in Boston, and she shouldn’t have.* But she should have! It was reasonable and appropriate for her to do so.

In order to exhibit Sally’s retraction as rational, we need to understand how she can reasonably take herself to have performed a speech act that is in some way incorrect.
The force-modifier approach lacks the resources to do this.

5 A “relativist” approach

Advocates of force-modifier accounts are typically well aware of the interface problems canvassed in the last section. That is why they motivate their views by arguing against truth-conditional approaches. For example, Simon Blackburn says that although his expressivist theory of evaluative language will no doubt have “Ptolemaic” complexities, there is no “Copernican” theory that explains the data better (Blackburn 1984, 195–6). Price’s argument for a force-modifier approach to “probably” proceeds along similar lines.

Such arguments work only if they can rule out all possible truth-conditional approaches. Typically, they assume that any such truth-conditional view must have a contextualist shape. In the case of epistemic modals, this means that the body of known facts relative to which the modal is assessed must be determined by features of the context of use (including the speaker’s intentions). We have seen above how one might argue quite generally that no view with this shape accurately captures the way we use epistemic modals.

But must a truth-conditional semantics for epistemic modals have this shape? In this section, I want to explore the possibility of broadening our semantic frameworks to make room for a new kind of view, on which the truth of epistemic modal claims depends on a body of known facts determined not by the context of use, but by what I’ll call the context of assessment. This semantics offers prospects for meeting the objections to contextualist views in a broadly truth-conditional framework, thereby undermining the motivation for the force-modifier approach.
5.1 Bicontextuality

We can understand the notion of a context of assessment by analogy with the familiar notion of a context of use:

**Context of use:** the setting for an actual or possible use of a sentence (or proposition) in a speech act or mental act.

**Context of assessment:** the setting from which such a use is being assessed for truth or falsity on some actual or possible occasion of assessment.

For many purposes, one can think of a context as a centered possible world—a world-time-agent triple—since all of the other contextual factors that are needed are determined once a centered world is given. We can then talk of “the speaker of the context of use,” “the time of the context of assessment,” or “the epistemic state of (the assessor at) the context of assessment.” Alternatively, one can think of a context of assessment as an abstract sequence of parameters representing semantically relevant features of a (concrete) setting from which a speech act or other use of a sentence might be assessed.

I will take the first approach here (following Lewis 1980 rather than Kaplan 1989), but nothing hangs on it.

Since we do assess uses of sentences, and whenever we do this we occupy some particular context, there is little to object to in the concept of a “context of assessment.” Semanticists of all stripes should be able to deploy this concept; the only question is whether it has a useful role to play. The question is whether the truth, reference and other semantic properties can depend not just on features of the context in which a sentence is used, but on features of the context in which it is assessed. To answer Yes to this question is to acknowledge a new kind of context sensitivity, which I have called
assessment sensitivity to distinguish it from the familiar use sensitivity.\textsuperscript{11}

It should be obvious where this is going. We started with the intuitively compelling idea that the truth of epistemic modal claims depends on what is known. That is why they are called “epistemic.” But we ran into trouble when we tried to answer the question, “known to whom?” For it seemed that people tend to assess epistemic modal claims for truth in light of what they (the assessors) know, even if they realize that they know more than the speaker (or relevant group) did at the time of utterance. A straightforward way to account for this puzzling fact is to suppose that epistemic modals are assessment-sensitive: the truth of an epistemic modal claim depends on what is known by the assessor, and thus varies with the context of assessment. On this view, epistemic modal claims have no “absolute” truth values, only assessment-relative truth values. This is why they resist being captured in standard frameworks for truth-conditional semantics.

For the sake of concreteness, we’ll work at first with the most austere kind of relativist view—what one might call Solipsistic Relativism. (Later we’ll consider some complications.) On this view, “Joe might be running” expresses a truth, as assessed by Sam, just in case what Sam knows (at the time of assessment) does not rule out that Joe is running. This is not yet a compositional semantics for “might,” since we have not explained how to handle embedded occurrences. More on that later (section 6). But we can already see from this sketch of a theory how Solipsistic Relativism will handle the data that seemed most problematic for the various forms of contextualism.

\textsuperscript{11}A sentence (or proposition) is use-sensitive iff its truth as used at $C_U$ and assessed at $C_A$ depends on features of $C_U$. A sentence (or proposition) is assessment-sensitive iff its truth as used at $C_U$ and assessed at $C_A$ depends on features of $C_A$.  

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5.2 Explaining third-party assessments

Solipsistic Relativism has a very straightforward explanation of the data about third-party assessments. According to Solipsistic Relativism, the truth of an epistemic modal claim (relative to a context of assessment) depends on what the assessor knows, not what the speaker knew when making the claim. So it is appropriate for eavesdroppers to assess the truth of epistemic modal claims against the background of what they know, even if this is very different from what the speaker knew.

Recall that the contextualist could only handle the eavesdropper data by strengthening truth conditions for claims of epistemic possibility to the point where it became hard to understand why people would make them at all. The relativist does not have this problem. Sally’s claim that Joe might be in Boston is true as assessed from the context in which she makes it, so we can understand why she makes it in the first place. In general, the Solipsistic Relativist will count a sentence as true as used at $C$ and assessed at $C$ just when the Solipsistic Contextualist counts it as true as used at $C$. The relativist semantics will diverge from the contextualist semantics only when the context of assessment is distinct from the context of use. So the Solipsistic Relativist will be able to explain production of epistemic modals in much the same way as the Solipsistic Contextualist, while explaining assessments in a way that is not available to the contextualist.\footnote{This needs some qualification, since it’s not clear that deliberation about whether to assert an assessment-sensitive proposition shouldn’t take into account its truth value relative to contexts of assessment other than the one occupied by the speaker. For example, one might refrain from asserting something one knows one will have to retract almost immediately, when one’s context changes, even if it is true relative to one’s current context.}

Hacking’s salvage ship case can be handled in the same way. It is really just another third-party assessment case, in which we (Hacking’s readers) are the third party.
According to Solipsistic Relativism, the truth of the mate’s claim (as assessed by us) depends on what we know. Since we know (from Hacking’s narrative) that the treasure lies elsewhere, the mate’s claim is false, relative to the context of assessment we occupy. That explains quite straightforwardly why we judge it to be false. The fact that there was a “practicable investigation” the mate could have carried out is simply irrelevant. What is crucial is something Hacking did not explicitly point out: that we, the readers, come to know, through Hacking’s testimony, that the treasure lies elsewhere.

5.3 Explaining retractions

The Solipsistic Relativist has an equally simple explanation of why Sally should retract her claim in response to George’s correction (section 2.2, above). After Sally learns from George that Joe is not in Boston, she occupies a context of assessment relative to which her original claim is false (since she now knows more than she did). So it is proper for her to retract it.

Note the change of perspective. The contextualist assumes that if what George says implies that Sally’s claim is false, then George must be part of the group whose knowledge matters to the truth of Sally’s claim. But as we have seen, this way leads to madness: there is no way to keep the group from expanding indefinitely. The relativist,

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13 Okay, we don’t really know, because it’s a fictional case, but Hacking is asking us to imagine a case in which we are being told about the ship and the treasure.

14 Here’s a test case. Suppose you know that Hacking is right about what the log says, but you have doubts about whether he is right about the location of the wreck, and you don’t know whether the log is accurate. Can you accept the conditional “If the log is accurate and the wreck is in the bay, then the mate’s claim is false”? Hacking, DeRose, and company should say Yes, while the Solipsistic Relativist should say No. I confess that I have no clear intuitions about this case. It is made more difficult by the difficulties surrounding the semantics of indicative conditionals, which themselves seem to be epistemic in some way, though perhaps we could also use a disjunction: “Either it’s not the case that the log is accurate and the wreck is in the bay, or the mate’s claim is false.”

15 Here I am relying on the normative account of assertion developed in MacFarlane 2005b, according to which one is obligated to retract an assertion that has been shown to have been false, relative to one’s current context of assessment.
by contrast, sees that what is important is not that *George* knew (when Sally made her original assertion) that Joe was in Berkeley, but that *Sally* comes to know this.

Hence it is irrelevant, for the relativist, that Sally comes to know this through the testimony of someone else who already knew it (at the time she made the claim). What is known by others is relevant only insofar as they are potential informants of the speaker (in this case, Sally). If they don’t speak up, or if they do speak up but Sally doesn’t believe them (and so doesn’t acquire knowledge), then Sally has no objective reason to retract her assertion. Conversely, if the way Sally comes to know something incompatible with Joe’s having been in Boston is not through others’ testimony but through her own observation, or through serendipitous discovery of evidence, she has just as much reason to retract her original claim, and it seems just as natural for her to do so. That the contextualist isn’t getting the right generalization here comes out clearly in her need for epicycles: for example, the appeal to “contextually relevant ways of coming to know” and “distributed knowledge” in addition to a “contextually relevant group of knowers.”

### 5.4 Explaining arguments

As we have seen, the contextualist has difficulty accounting for the fact that people take themselves to be arguing and disagreeing about epistemic modal claims. What are they arguing about? Not about what some particular one of them knows. Perhaps, then, what the group knows. But what if another group joins the discussion? This should seem like a change of subject, and it doesn’t. Their arguments seem to concern a common topic—say, whether it is possible that infected birds have entered Alameda county—and this topic can’t be reduced to a question about what anyone, or any group,
knows.

The Solipsistic Relativist gets this right. On the relativist’s account, epistemic modal claims aren’t equivalent to any claims about what people know. The former are assessment-sensitive, and the latter are not, or not in the same way. The relativist can say that every group that is debating whether it is possible that infected birds have entered Alameda county (by such and such a date) is debating the truth of the same proposition. It’s just that the truth of this proposition is perspectival.

5.5 Philosophical debts

Let’s take stock. In sections 2 and 3, we saw that contextualist semantics is structurally unable to explain our use of epistemic modals. In order to explain third-party assessments, retraction, and arguments, we need to widen the contextually relevant group of knowers—perhaps indefinitely—and put further, “objective” conditions on the truth of epistemic modal claims. But when we do this, it becomes impossible to explain our readiness to make epistemic modal claims even in situations where we are well aware that others may know more than we do. Historically, this problem was one motivation for the view that epistemic modals should be understood non-truth-conditionally, as modifiers of the force of a speech act rather than its content. However, as we saw in section 4, this project requires a piecemeal account of the role of epistemic modals in embedded contexts. Such an account, if possible at all, is likely to be very complex. Moreover, force-modifier accounts don’t do any better than Solipsistic Contextualism in explaining the retraction data. So we are left with no good account of the meanings

\[16\] In MacFarlane 2005a, I argue that knowledge-attributing sentences are assessment-sensitive, because their truth (relative to a context of assessment) depends on the assessor’s epistemic standards. But even if this is right, their truth is not sensitive to the same features of contexts of assessment as epistemic modals, so they still won’t be equivalent to any epistemic modal claims.
of epistemic modals.

Solipsistic Relativism offers a way out. It neatly explains the data that proved impossible to accommodate in a contextualist framework, and it does so without giving up the advantages of a truth-conditional framework. But is it intelligible? If we are to use an assessment-relative truth predicate in our semantic theories, we must pay some philosophical debts. At the very least, we must answer these questions:

1. What changes does relativism require in standard theories of propositions, standard accounts of assertion and belief, and standard approaches to compositional semantics?

2. Isn’t this kind of relativism about truth self-undermining, for reasons given by Plato in the *Theaetetus* and repeated by many philosophers since?

3. Even if talk of truth relative to a context of assessment is not self-undermining, do we really understand it? What is it to commit oneself to the truth of an assessment-sensitive proposition? Can the relativist make sense of the idea that belief “aims at” truth?

4. Can we really make sense of disagreement about assessment-sensitive claims? If so, what is the point of disagreeing about things whose truth is relative?

5. More broadly, what purpose is served by assessment sensitivity? What would we be lacking if we replaced our assessment-sensitive expressions with assessment-invariant ones (not talking about what might be the case, for example, but only about what various people do and do not know about it)?

I will not try to answer these questions here. I have addressed the first three in MacFarlane 2005b and the last two in MacFarlane, forthcoming. But there is much more
clarificatory work to be done before we can be confident that we understand what we are saying when we characterize a claim as true “relative to a context of assessment.”

6 Compositional Semantics

The rough characterization of Solipsistic Contextualism in the previous section refers only to standalone sentences in which the epistemic modal takes widest scope. But of course epistemic modals can also occur embedded under quantifiers, conditionals, and other kinds of operators. Since one of the advertised advantages of relativist semantics over the force-modifier approach is its capacity to explain embedded uses, it’s worth looking at how standard semantic frameworks must be modified in order to make room for assessment sensitivity, and how a compositional semantics for epistemic modals might look in such a framework.

6.1 Baseline: solipsistic contextualism

As a baseline for comparison, let’s start with a simple version of Solipsistic Contextualism. The aim is to give a finite definition of “true at context of use $C$” for a first-order language containing the epistemic modal operator “$Might :$” (“it is possible that”) and an operator “$FAK_{x} :$” (“for all $x$ knows at $t$”). Since “$Might :$”, “$FAK_{x} :$”, and the quantifiers are not truth-functional, we can’t simply give a recursive definition of truth at a context of use. Instead, we’ll give a recursive definition of truth at a point of evaluation, then define truth at a context of use in terms of truth at a point of evaluation.\footnote{Cf. Tarski 1944, §11, Kaplan 1989, 547.} Here a point of evaluation is an ordered quadruple $⟨C, S, w, a⟩$, where $C$ is a context, $S$ a set of possible worlds representing an information state (intuitively, the worlds left
open by a particular state of information), \( w \) a possible world,\(^{18} \) and \( a \) an assignment of objects from the domain relevant at \( C \) to the variables.

First, we define the extensions of the primitive terms and predicates of the language, relative to a point of evaluation:

- The extension of “Joe” at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle = \text{Joe} \).
- The extension of “I” at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle = \text{the agent centered at } C \).
- The extension of “now” at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle = \text{the time of } C \).
- The extension of “human” at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle = \text{the set of humans in } w \).
- And so on (finitely many of these).

We can now define truth at a point of evaluation recursively as follows:

- \( \Box \phi(\alpha) \) is true at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle \) iff the extension of \( \alpha \) at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle \) belongs to the extension of \( \phi \) at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle \). (And similarly for polyadic predicates.)
- \( \Box \neg \Phi \) is true at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle \) iff \( \Phi \) is not true at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle \).
- \( \Box \Phi \land \Psi \) is true at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle \) iff \( \Phi \) is true at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle \) and \( \Psi \) is true at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle \).
- \( \Box \exists \alpha \Phi \) is true at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle \) iff for some assignment \( a' \) that agrees with \( a \) on every variable except possibly \( \alpha \), \( \Phi \) is true at \( \langle C, S, w, a' \rangle \).
- \( \Box \text{Might} : \Phi \) is true at \( \langle C, S, w, a \rangle \) iff for some \( w' \) in \( S \), \( \Phi \) is true at \( \langle C, S, w', a \rangle \).

\(^{18}\) I won’t worry here about how these worlds are to be individuated or whether the same set of worlds can be used in semantics for alethic modals. Though these are important questions, they cross-cut the questions of primary concern to us here.
• $\gamma FAK^\alpha \Phi^\gamma$ is true at $\langle C, S, w, a \rangle$ iff $\Phi$ is true at $\langle C, S', w', a \rangle$, where $S'$ is the set of worlds not excluded by what is known by the extension of $\alpha$ at $\langle C, S, w, a \rangle$ at $w$ and the time denoted by $\tau$ at $\langle C, S, w, a \rangle$, and $w'$ is some world in $S'$.

Finally, we can define truth at a context in terms of truth at a point of evaluation:\textsuperscript{19}

An occurrence of a sentence $\Phi$ at a context $C$ is true\textsuperscript{20} iff $\Phi$ is true at every point of evaluation $\langle C, S_C, w_C, a \rangle$, where

- $S_C$ = the set of worlds that aren’t excluded by what is known (at $C$) by the agent centered on $C$,
- $w_C$ = the world of $C$,\textsuperscript{21}
- $a$ = an assignment of objects from the domain relevant at $C$ to the variables.

Note that truth at a point of evaluation is defined for all formulas, but truth at a context of use is defined only for sentences (formulas with no free variables).

Let’s verify that this account accords with the rough initial statement of Solipsistic Contextualism from section 1. Let $\Phi$ be the sentence “$\text{Might : Joe is running}$,” let $C$ be a context in which George is uttering $\Phi$, and let $S_C$ be the set of worlds left open by what George knows at $C$. Our definition of truth at a point of evaluation tells us that $\Phi$ is true at a point of evaluation $\langle C, S, w, a \rangle$ just in case there is some world $w' \in S$ such that “Joe is running” is true at $\langle C, S, w', a \rangle$. Feeding this into our definition of truth at a context, we get that an occurrence of $\Phi$ at $C$ is true just in case there is some world $w' \in S_C$ such that “Joe is running” is true at $\langle C, S_C, w', a \rangle$ for all assignments $a$. In

\textsuperscript{19}Compare Kaplan 1989, 522.
\textsuperscript{20}In what follows, I’ll use “$\Phi$ is true at $C$” interchangeably with “an occurrence of $\Phi$ at $C$ is true.”
\textsuperscript{21}The assumption that there is a unique “world of $C$” might prove problematic on some ways of thinking of the epistemic “worlds.” I’m not going to pursue this issue further here.
other worlds, just in case what George knows at \( C \) does not rule out the truth of “Joe is running.”

Logical truth and logical consequence can be defined (after Kaplan) as truth and truth preservation at every context:

A sentence \( \Phi \) is *logically true* iff for every possible context of use \( C \), \( \Phi \) is true at \( C \).

A sentence \( \Phi \) is a *logical consequence* of a set \( \Gamma \) of sentences iff for every possible context of use \( C \), if every member of \( \Gamma \) is true at \( C \), then \( \Phi \) is true at \( C \).

It is also useful to define a notion of logical necessity that quantifies over points of evaluation rather than contexts, and a corresponding notion of logical implication:

(11) A formula \( \Phi \) is logically necessary iff for every point of evaluation \( \pi \), \( \Phi \) is true at \( \pi \).

(12) A formula \( \Phi \) is logically implied by a set \( \Gamma \) of formulas iff for every point of evaluation \( \pi \), if every member of \( \Gamma \) is true at \( \pi \), then \( \Phi \) is true at \( \pi \).

If a sentence is logically necessary, it is logically true, but the converse is not guaranteed. Similarly, if \( \Phi \) is logically implied by \( \Gamma \), it is a logical consequence of \( \Gamma \), but the converse is not guaranteed.

Using these definitions, we can show that \( \Gamma^{FAK}_{now} : \Phi \) and \( \Gamma^{Might} : \Phi \) are equivalent in the sense that each is a logical consequence of the other. Let \( C \) be any context.

Let \( w_C \) be the world of \( C \), \( t_C \) the time of \( C \), \( a_C \) the agent centered on \( C \), and \( S_C \) the

\[ \text{Note that logical truth and consequence are defined only for sentences (closed formulas), while logical necessity and implication are defined for (open or closed) formulas.} \]
set of worlds not excluded by what $a_C$ knows at $C$. Let $a'$ be an arbitrary assignment: since we won’t be dealing with open formulas, any formula that is satisfied by $a'$ can be assumed to be satisfied by any assignment. By the definition of truth at a context, $\Gamma FAK'_{now} : \Phi \models$ is true at $C$ iff it is true at the point $\langle C, S_C, w_C, a' \rangle$. By the recursive clause for $FAK:$, $\Gamma FAK'_{now} : \Phi \models$ is true at $\langle C, S_C, w_C, a' \rangle$ iff $\Phi$ is true at $\langle C, S', w', a' \rangle$, where $S'$ is the set of worlds not excluded by what is known at $C$ by the extension of “I” at $\langle C, S, w, a \rangle$ at $w_C$ and the time denoted by “now” at $\langle C, S, w, a \rangle$, and $w'$ is some world in $S'$. But the extension of “I” at $\langle C, S, w, a \rangle$ is $a_C$ and the time denoted by “now” at $\langle C, S, w, a \rangle$ is $t_C$. So $S' = S_C$. It follows that $\Gamma FAK'_{now} : \Phi \models$ is true at $C$ iff for some world $w' \in S_C$, $\Phi$ is true at $\langle C, S_C, w', a' \rangle$. On the other side, $\Gamma Might : \Phi \models$ is true at $C$ iff it is true at the point $\langle C, S_C, w_C, a' \rangle$ iff for some $w' \in S_C$, $\Phi$ is true at the point $\langle C, S_C, w', a' \rangle$. So $\Gamma FAK'_{now} : \Phi \models$ is true at exactly the same contexts as $\Gamma Might : \Phi \models$, from which it follows immediately that they are logical consequences of each other. This is a nice result, because Solipsistic Contextualism was motivated in large part by the intuition that “It might be that $P$” and “For all I know, $P$” are in some strong sense equivalent.

(Note that they are not equivalent in the stronger sense of logically implying each other. For there are points of evaluation at which one is true and the other false. To see this, note that the truth value of $\Gamma FAK'_{now} : \Phi \models$ at a point of evaluation $\langle C, S, w, a \rangle$ does not depend at all on the value of $S$, while the truth value of $\Gamma Might : \Phi \models$ at that point does depend on the value of $S$. This makes a difference in embedded contexts: for example, “For all John knows, for all I know now it is raining” can diverge in truth value from “For all John knows, it might be raining.”)

It can also be shown that $\Gamma FAK'_{now} : \Phi \models$ is strongly equivalent to $\Gamma FAK'_{now} : Might : \Phi \models$: they are true at just the same points of evaluation. This, too, is satisfying,
insofar as we seem to use these forms interchangeably in English.

### 6.2 Going nonsolipsistic

If we want to make our semantics less solipsistic, it’s very easy to do. We can leave everything in the recursive definition of truth at a point of evaluation just as it is. All we need to change is the definition of truth at a context:

An occurrence of a sentence $\Phi$ at a context $C$ is true iff $\Phi$ is true at every point of evaluation $\langle C, S_C, w_C, a \rangle$, where

- $S_C =$ the set of worlds that aren’t excluded by what is known *distributively* at $C$ by the *group of knowers relevant at $C$*,
- $w_C =$ the world of $C$,
- $a =$ an assignment of objects from the domain relevant at $C$ to the variables.

We could add “objective factors” just as easily—again, by modifying the clause for $S_C$ in the above definition.

### 6.3 Making room for assessment sensitivity

It turns out that moving to a view on which “might” is assessment-sensitive is nearly as easy. Again, we need not modify the recursive definition of truth at a point of evaluation. The only change needed is in the definition of truth at a context—or, now, at contexts, for we can only ask about the truth of an occurrence of a sentence relative to some particular context of assessment. To move from Solipsistic Contextualism
to Solipsistic Relativism, we need only substitute the context of assessment for the context of use in the clause governing the initialization of the $S$ parameter:

An occurrence of a sentence $\Phi$ at a context $C_U$ is true as assessed from a context $C_A$ $^{23}$ iff $\Phi$ is true at every point of evaluation $\langle C_U, S_{C_A}, w_{C_U}, a \rangle$, where

- $S_{C_A} = \text{the set of worlds that aren't excluded by what is known (at } C_A) \text{ by the agent centered on } C_A,$
- $w_{C_U} = \text{the world of } C_U,$
- $a = \text{an assignment of objects from the domain relevant at } C \text{ to the variables}.$

It is trivial to verify that these definitions yield the result described earlier, that $\lbrack \lbrack \text{Might} : \Phi \rbrack \rbrack$ is true as used at $C_U$ and assessed at $C_A$ iff what is known to the assessor at $C_A$ is compatible with the truth of $\Phi$ at $\langle C_U, C_A \rangle$.

Logical truth and consequence can be defined as before, only we quantify over both contexts of use and contexts of assessment:

A sentence $\Phi$ is \textit{logically true} iff for every possible context of use $C_U$ and context of assessment $C_A$, $\Phi$ is true as used at $C_U$ and assessed from $C_A$.

A sentence $\Phi$ is a \textit{logical consequence} of a set $\Gamma$ of sentences iff for every possible context of use $C_U$ and context of assessment $C_A$, if every member of $\Gamma$ is true as used at $C_U$ and assessed from $C_A$, then $\Phi$ is true as used at $C_U$ and assessed from $C_A$.

$^{23}$In what follows, I'll use “$S$ is true at context of use $C_U$ and context of assessment $C_A$” interchangeably with “an occurrence of $S$ at $C_U$ is true as assessed from $C_A$.”
On this semantics, we no longer get the result that $\forall FAK_{now} : \Phi \uparrow$ and $\forall Might : \Phi \uparrow$ are logical consequences of each other. To see that they could not be, it suffices to notice that the latter is assessment-sensitive while the former is not. However, a weaker kind of equivalence holds: they are diagonally equivalent.$^{24}$

Two sentences $\Phi$ and $\Psi$ are diagonally equivalent iff for any possible context $C$, $\Phi$ is true as used at and assessed from $C$ just in case $\Psi$ is true as used at and assessed from $C$.

That is, a speaker considering $\forall FAK_{now} : \Phi \uparrow$ and $\forall Might : \Phi \uparrow$ from a particular context $C$ should hold that an occurrence of either at $C$ would have the same truth value. This vindicates the intuition behind Solipsistic Contextualism: that it is correct to say “It is possible that $P$” just when what one knows does not exclude $P$. However, the assessment sensitive view does not take these sentences to be logically equivalent, and so leaves room for them to be (correctly) assessed as having different truth values, from contexts other than the context of use.

### 6.4 Monadic “true”

The relativist semantics makes use of two relativized truth predicates: (1) truth of a formula at a point of evaluation and (2) truth of a sentence at a context of use and context of assessment. These are theoretical notions that get their significance from the role they play in a larger theory of meaning.$^{25}$ But what about the monadic predicate “true” used by ordinary speakers—a predicate that applies to propositions, not to sentences? Can the relativist make sense of this? Yes—it’s just another bit of vocabulary in the object language, and we can give semantics for it just as we can for other predicates.

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$^{24}$ The proof is straightforward.

$^{25}$ For details, see MacFarlane 2005b.
First we need a proto-theory of propositions. We don’t need to say in any detail what propositions are, or how they are individuated. We will assume only that there is such a thing as (for example) the proposition that Smith might be the murderer. Supposing there is such a proposition, what can we say about its truth? Presumably it will have different truth values relative to different possible worlds (since there are worlds in which the murder never took place, worlds in which Smith is known by everyone to have been in a coma, etc.). This is a standard assumption about propositional truth. But the relativist will also take its truth to be relative to a set of propositions (those not excluded by “what is known”). Since the context of use does not (on the relativist view) fix this set, we must suppose that the truth of the proposition expressed is fixed only when such a set is supplied. Propositional truth, then, is relative to a world and a set of nonexcluded worlds.\footnote{Egan et al. 2005 and Egan (forthcoming) take truth for epistemic modal propositions to be relative to a world, time, and an agent as “center.” This approach may seem simpler than the one I have pursued, and less radical (insofar as centered worlds are already used in “standard” semantics), so it is worth taking a moment to explain why I am not inclined to go this way. The basic problem is that, although an world-time-agent triple is guaranteed to determine a pair of a privileged world and a set of worlds—the set of worlds not excluded by what is known by the agent at the world and time—the reverse is not the case. Given an arbitrary world \(w\) and set of worlds \(S\), there is no guarantee that there will be a triple \(\langle w, t, A \rangle\) such that \(S\) is the set of worlds not excluded by what is known by \(A\) at \(w\) and \(t\). Indeed, we know that some combinations of \(S\) and \(w\) will not be determined by any \(\langle w, t, A \rangle\). For, knowledge being factive, \(w\) must surely belong to the set of worlds not excluded by what is known by \(A\) at \(w\) and \(t\), so centered worlds will not determine any \(\langle w, S \rangle\) pairs where \(w \notin S\).

Why does this matter? Well, suppose that at \(C_A\) we are assessing an assertion at \(C_V\) of the proposition that \(p\). We should judge the assertion true just in case \(p\) is true at \(\langle w_{C_U}, S_{C_A} \rangle\). If we are assessing a merely counterfactual assertion, so that the world of \(C_U\) is not our world, it may be that \(w_{C_U} \notin S_{C_A}\). This is no problem if we take propositional truth to be relative to world-set pairs. But what do we do if we take propositional truth to be relative to world-time-agent triples? There’s not going to be a triple that gives us the world and the set of nonexcluded worlds we need. The problem, in short, is that centered worlds “entangle” parameters that need to be free to move independently in the semantic theory.}

Of course, the object-language truth predicate does not have argument places for these; it is monadic. So an account of its semantics must explain how these argument places are to be filled in. The answer is obvious: we just extract these values from our
points of evaluation.

The extension of “True” at a point of evaluation \(\langle C_U, w, S, a \rangle\) is the set of propositions \(p\) such that \(p\) is true at \(\langle w, S \rangle\).

“True” so defined is disquotational: every instance of the following schema is logically necessary (true at every point of evaluation):

\[
\forall x((x = \text{the proposition that } P) \supset (\text{True}(x) \equiv P))
\]

(where \(P\) is replaced by a sentence).\(^{27}\) This is a welcome result. A disquotational truth predicate is a useful expressive device, and it is reassuring that the relativist can make good sense of it.

It is a corollary of this result that when \(P\) is assessment-sensitive and \(a\) denotes the proposition expressed by \(P\), ‘\(\text{True}(a)\)’ will also be assessment-sensitive.

### 7 Tensed Epistemic Modals

I want to close with a discussion of two problems I regard as open and difficult. The first concerns the interaction of epistemic modals and tense; the second concerns the robustness of the data used to motivate the relativist semantics. I will not try to resolve these issues here; the aim is to provide a prolegomenon to further investigations.

On all of the views we’ve considered so far, the set of epistemically open worlds with respect to which epistemic modals are evaluated is supplied entirely by context. For the Solipsistic Contextualist, it is the set of worlds not excluded by what

\(^{27}\)Proof: Take any sentence \(P\) and consider any point of evaluation \(\langle C_U, w, S, a \rangle\). The schema (as instantiated with \(P\)) is true at this point of evaluation iff for every assignment \(a'\) such that \(a'\) differs from \(a\) at most on the value of \(x\) and ‘\(x = \text{the proposition that } P'\) is true at \(\langle C_U, w, S, a' \rangle\), ‘\(\text{True}(x) \equiv P'\) is also true at \(\langle C_U, w, S, a' \rangle\). To see that this is the case, note that ‘\(\text{True}(x)\)’ is true at \(\langle C_U, w, S, a' \rangle\) iff \(a'(x)\) is true at \(\langle w, S \rangle\). But this is so iff \(P\) is true at \(\langle C_U, w, S, a' \rangle\), because \(a'(x)\) is the proposition expressed by \(P\) at \(C_U\). So ‘\(\text{True}(x) \equiv P'\) is true at \(\langle C_U, w, S, a' \rangle\).
the speaker knows at the time of utterance; for the Nonsolipsistic Contextualist, it is
the set of worlds not excluded by what the contextually relevant group knows at the
time of utterance; for the Solipsistic Relativist, it is the set of worlds not excluded by
what the assessor knows at the time of assessment. Let us suppose all these contextual
factors have been fixed; then, either the set of nonexcluded worlds contains worlds
at which Fermat’s Last Theorem is false or it does not. If it does, then the second
conjunct of

(13) In 1980 it was possible that Fermat’s Last Theorem was false, but this is not
possible today.

is false. If it doesn’t, then the first conjunct is false: the past tense has no effect, because
there is no time variable associated with the epistemic modal. Either way, then, (13) is
false. On all of these views, “possible” and “might” are temporally rigid: like “now”
and “yesterday,” they are unaffected by shifts in the time of evaluation.

This might be thought to be a bad consequence. I am not so sure. It seems fairly
clear that epistemic modals are unaffected by embeddings under alethic modals. Con-
sider:

(14) It isn’t possible that Jones is the murderer, but if no one had looked in this desk,

it would have been possible that Jones was the murderer.

Surely (14) can’t be true. Counterfactual changes in what we know do not induce coun-
terfactual changes in what is epistemically possible. But if that’s right, why should
trans-temporal changes in what is known induce trans-temporal changes in what is
epistemically possible? The (alethic) modal rigidity of epistemic modals is some evi-
dence for their temporal rigidity. Intuitions about (13) are not as clear, but to me it has
the same odd feel as (14). A much more natural thing to say would be

(15) In 1980 people thought it possible that Fermat’s Last Theorem was false, but we know today that this is not possible.

Here is a similar test case with a contingent sentence embedded under the epistemic modal:

(16) We know now that Sarah murdered Jenkins by herself. But yesterday it was possible that she had an accomplice.

We do sometimes hear this kind of thing, especially in legal contexts. But my (admittedly contaminated) intuition is that it is, strictly speaking, false. What is meant is

(17) We know now that Sarah must have murdered Jenkins by herself. But yesterday it was possible for all we knew that she had an accomplice. (Or: yesterday it had seemed possible that she had an accomplice.)

If you’re not convinced, consider asking someone who asserts (16) at what time it became impossible that Sarah had an accomplice, and what changed to make it so. I predict embarrassment. For the only answer is, “At N o’clock, when we learned such and such.” And this answer commits the speaker to the view that by learning something, she made it impossible that Sarah had an accomplice. I believe that ordinary speakers (those not already indoctrinated into contextualist theories of epistemic modals) will find this consequence bizarre.

28 If we cash in “possible” for “might,” it sounds even worse: “In 1980 Fermat’s Last Theorem might have been false, but today it must be true.” But this may be due to syntactic differences between “might” and “possible.”
Here’s a real-life example, from a *New York Times* article concerning *Science’s* retraction of a paper reporting the production of eleven lines of cloned human embryonic stem cells: 29

The retraction did not include information revealed in South Korea at a news conference on Thursday. Until then, *it had seemed possible* that Dr. Hwang’s group had created 2 cloned stem cell lines, not 11. On Thursday, the investigators in Seoul said that even those two were not clones.

(emphasis added)

Notice how odd it would have been to say, “Until then, it had *been* possible that Dr. Hwang’s group had created 2 cloned stem cell lines, not 11,” despite the fact that the information revealing that no cloned lines had been created was not known until the press conference.

Thus it is far from clear that simple temporal embeddings like (13) and (16) should motivate us to make epistemic modals time-indexed. But there are more complex cases that are harder to dismiss in this way:

(18) I studied that book because it was possible that Fermat’s Last Theorem would be refuted using its techniques.

(19) He lectures in a bulletproof vest whenever it is possible that members of the audience are packing handguns.

(20) Whenever it was possible that Mary was drunk, the people she came with drove her home. 30

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30 I owe this example to Fabrizio Cariani.
(18) is problematic because “becausal” contexts are factive: “A because B” implies B. Suppose that both the speaker and the assessor of an occurrence of (18) know that Fermat’s Last Theorem has been proven (and so, presumably, can’t be refuted). Then, on all of the views we’ve been considering, (18) comes out false. (Recall that on these accounts, the tense does not affect the set of worlds with respect to which “possible” is evaluated.) But intuitively, it seems that one could truly assert (18), provided it was not known at the time one studied the book that Fermat’s Last Theorem had been proven. This suggests that the set of epistemically open worlds relative to which “possible” is evaluated can be shifted by temporal modifiers. Similarly, it seems that in (19), “possible” needs to be evaluated with respect to the sets of worlds left open by what is known (presumably by the lecturer) on various occasions of lecturing. And in (20), “possible” needs to be evaluated with respect to what is known (by the people Mary came with, or possibly by the speaker) on various occasions of partying. Neither Solipsistic Contextualism nor Solipsistic Relativism can deliver these results.

There are two ways in which we might try to handle these problem cases. The first is as cases of loose talk. Suppose Joey believes there is a monster under his bed and hides in the closet. We might explain his behavior this way:

(21) Joey is hiding in the closet because he thinks there’s a monster under his bed.

But we might also say, adopting Joey’s point of view:

(22) Joey is hiding in the closet because there’s a monster under his bed.

Similarly, we might generalize as follows:

(23) Whenever he thinks there’s a monster under his bed, Joey hides in the closet.

But we would be well understood if we just said:
(24) Whenever there’s a monster under his bed, Joey hides in the closet.

It would be nuts to handle these examples by fiddling with the semantics of “there’s a monster under his bed,” for we can construct similar examples with just about any declarative sentence. Better to stick with a core meaning of “there’s a monster under his bed” on which it expresses a falsehood, and understand (22) and (24) and loose ways of expressing the propositions literally expressed by (21) and (23). I don’t want to take a stand here on how, exactly, this should be done. The point is just that, in view of the ease with which we can construct examples like (22) and (24), we should be wary of taking (18), (19), and (20) to carry specific lessons for the semantics of epistemic modals.

Some might think that although the true-seeming uses of (22) and (24) should be handled as cases of loose talk, this strategy cannot be extended to (18), (19), and (20). If that’s right, then we’ll need to modify our semantics to make room for significant temporal modification of epistemic modals. I don’t want to go into the details here of how this might be done: this depends, in part, on how one handles tense and variable binding in general, and would take us too far from the topic of epistemic modals. Certainly we would want an account that satisfies the following desiderata:

1. It should predict at least these two readings for (20):

   (25) Whenever it was possible (for all they knew) that Mary was drunk, the people she came with drove her home.

   (26) Whenever it was possible (for all I knew) that Mary was drunk, the people she came with drove her home.\(^{31}\)

\(^{31}\)If you’re having trouble getting this reading, try continuing (20) with “This seems to have been a lucky coincidence, because they were usually too plastered to notice her condition.”
This suggests that we’ll need separate time and agent variables attached to epistemic modals, and that these can be either anaphorically bound to a definite description or quantifier, or given a value by context.

2. It should predict at least one reading of

(27) In the year 900, it was possible that the earth was flat

on which it is false. (Perhaps there is also a reading on which it is true, though for reasons mentioned above, I am doubtful of this.) This suggests, again, that the time variable or index must not be invariably bound by an embedding temporal modifier, even if it can sometimes be so bound.

In lieu of actually giving an account that meets these desiderata, I just want to point out three things. First, in light of (22) and (24), it is not clear that we need to complicate our semantics this way to deal with the data. I have yet to see a compelling argument that we do. Second, even if we do, this is not specifically a problem for the relativist: it is a problem for any view that evaluates epistemic modals against a set of epistemically open worlds supplied directly by context, including our version of Solipsistic Contextualism. The relativist is at no particular disadvantage here. Third, what makes a semantics “relativist” is that it allows some assessment-sensitive readings of some sentences containing epistemic modals. It need not hold that every such sentence is assessment-sensitive; a relativist semantics could hold, for example, that (20), for example, has no assessment-sensitive readings, provided this is predicted by a systematic theory that gives other sentences assessment-sensitive readings.

In sum, then: questions about the interactions between temporal modifiers and epistemic modals, while vexing, should not give us any particular reason to worry
about semantic theories that assign assessment-sensitive readings to sentences containing epistemic modals.

8 Doubts about the Data

The second set of worries I want to discuss concerns the robustness of the data used to motivate the relativist semantics.

8.1 Limits to retrospective correction?

Immediately after presenting his “salvage ship” case, discussed in section 3.2, above, Ian Hacking writes:

When one starts collecting examples like this, it begins to look as if, whenever it turns out to be false that \( p \), we say, of an earlier era, that in those times it may have seemed possible that \( p \), but it was not really possible at all.

If Hacking had endorsed this description of the data, he would have been well on the road to relativism. For only a relativist semantics can explain why earlier epistemic modal claims are always evaluated in light of what we know now (at the time of assessment), even when we know much more than was known at the time the claim was made.

However, Hacking thinks that this description of the data “would be too strong.” Here’s why:

Consider a person who buys a lottery ticket. At the time he buys his ticket we shall say it is possible he will win, though probably he will not. As
expected, he loses. But retrospectively it would be absurd to report that it only *seemed* possible that the man would win. It was perfectly possible that he would win. To see this clearly, consider a slightly different case, in which the lottery is not above board; it is rigged so that only the proprietors can win. Thus, however it may have seemed to the gullible customer, it really was not possible that he would win. It only seemed so. “Seemed possible” and “was possible” both have work cut out for them. (Hacking 1967, 148)

If Hacking is interpreting his example correctly, it spells trouble for the relativist. For it suggests that the retrospective assessment data used to motivate relativism do not extend as far as the relativist needs them to. In the case of the non-rigged lottery, it seems, we *don’t* assess our earlier claim that it was possible that the man would win as false, despite the fact that what we know now (after the lottery) excludes his having won. This seems to favor some version of nonsolipsistic contextualism over relativism.

However, it is far from clear that Hacking’s interpretation of the example is correct. Hacking says,

(28) It was perfectly possible that he would win,

and this seems right. But assent to (28) is only problematic for the relativist if “possible” in it is an epistemic modal. And there are at least three reasons for supposing that it is not:

1. The embedded clause (“that he would win”) is in the subjunctive mood. Epistemic uses of “possible” characteristically take the indicative. So, let’s try forcing an epistemic reading by putting the clause in the indicative (rephrasing it a bit to avoid grammatical difficulties): “It was perfectly possible that he had the
winning ticket.” Now my willingness to accept the sentence vanishes. We know he did not, in fact, have the winning ticket, so we can’t assert that it was possible that he did.

2. Suppose the universe evolves deterministically. Does that assumption make a difference to your willingness to accept (28)? If it does—and it does for me—that is strong evidence that the modal in (28) is alethic. For whether the universe evolves deterministically is independent of the truth of epistemic modal claims. Determinism is compatible with universal ignorance about how things will evolve.

3. We will certainly not accept “It is perfectly possible that his ticket was going to be the winning one.” So if we accept (28), it must be because the tense governing “possible” makes a semantic difference. But we have seen reason (in section 7) to doubt that epistemic modals in simple sentences like (28) are sensitive to temporal embeddings.

If “possible” in (28) is not an epistemic modal, then Hacking’s example does nothing to call into question the evidence supporting an assessment-sensitive semantics for epistemic modals.

8.2 Ignorant assessors

Richard Dietz has observed that although our intuitions about retrospective assessments seem to support relativist semantics when the assessor knows more than the original asserter, they do not do so when the assessor knows less. Here is a variation on one of Dietz’s examples. Suppose that yesterday I proved Theorem X and asserted
“Theorem X must be true.” Today, however, my memory has gone fuzzy. I recall that I was working on Theorem X, but I don’t remember whether I proved it, refuted it, or did neither. If Solipsistic Relativism is correct, I should be able to say:

(29) If I said “Theorem X must be true” yesterday, then what I said was false.

For what I know now (at the context of assessment) leaves open the possibility that Theorem X is false, and the truth of a “must” claim requires that all possibilities of falsehood be excluded.\(^{32}\) And this seems very bizarre. Intuitively, I don’t have warrant to pronounce on the falsity of claims made by my better-informed past self, even when these claims contain epistemic modals.

If epistemic possibility is perspectival, this data suggests, it is asymmetrically perspectival. The truth of epistemic modal claims can depend on what is known by the assessor, but only if the assessor knows more than the original asserter.

Taking this asymmetry into account complicates the relativist account considerably. The semantics must track both what is known by the asserter and what is known by the assessor, and then amalgamate these two bodies of knowledge into a single body of known facts with respect to which the epistemic modal is to be evaluated. Perhaps the simplest way to do this is to conjoin the two bodies of knowledge. The definition of truth of an occurrence of a sentence in context would then look like this (only the first bulleted item has changed from section 6.3):

An occurrence of a sentence \(\Phi\) at a context \(C_U\) is true as assessed from a context \(C_A\) iff \(\Phi\) is true at every point of evaluation \(\langle C_U, S_{C_U+C_A}, w_{C_U}, a\rangle\),

where

\(^{32}\)Note that given the account of “True” from section 6.4, above, it does not matter whether we say “is false” or “was false” in (29).
• $S_{C_U+C_A} = \text{the set of worlds that aren’t excluded either by what is known} \ (at \ C_A) \ \text{by the agent centered on} \ C_A \ \text{or by what is known} \ (at \ C_U) \ \text{by the agent centered on} \ C_U,$

• $w_{C_U} = \text{the world of} \ C_U,$

• $a = \text{an assignment of objects from the domain of} \ C \ \text{to the variables.}$

Another alternative would be to consider what is known \textit{distributively} by the speaker at $C_U$ and the assessor at $C_A$:

• $S_{C_U+C_A} = \text{the set of worlds that aren’t excluded by what would be known by a rational agent who knew everything known at} \ C_A \ \text{by the agent centered on} \ C_A \ \text{and everything known at} \ C_U \ \text{by the agent centered on} \ C_U,$

I won’t try to decide here between these alternatives.\textsuperscript{33}

The revised account, which we might call \textsc{Semisolipsistic Relativism}, would agree with Solipsistic Relativism on every case where the assessor is not ignorant of any relevant facts that the utterer knows. Since this includes all of the cases we used to motivate the relativist account, the revised account is equally well supported.

One consequence of the move to Semisolipsistic Relativism is that it makes it difficult to \textit{reiterate} epistemic modal claims. Suppose Sally says (at time $t$)

(30) \text{It’s possible that Joe is six years old.}

How can we make a claim with the same truth conditions as Sally’s—one that is guaranteed to have the same truth value as hers relative to every context of assessment? For the Solipsistic Relativist, this task is easy:

\textsuperscript{33}\text{I owe the basic idea for the fix to Brian Weatherson. I don’t know which version, if either, he would endorse.}
(31) It’s possible that Joe is six years old at \( t \)

will do the trick. For the Solipsistic Contextualist, it is equally easy:

(32) For all Sally knows at \( t \), Joe is six years old at \( t \).

But for the Semisolipsistic Relativist, neither of these sentences can be used to make a claim that can be counted on to have the same truth value as Sally’s claim relative to every context of assessment. For according to Semisolipsistic Relativism, the truth of (31), as uttered by Bill and assessed by Judy, will depend in part on what is known by Bill, while the truth of (30), as uttered by Sally and assessed by Judy, will not depend at all on what is known by Bill. And since (32) is not assessment-sensitive, it cannot serve to reiterate Sally’s assertion of (30), which is. Thus, on the Semisolipsistic Relativist view, epistemic modal claims are perspectival in the very strong sense that a claim made from one perspective cannot be reiterated in another, except by the use of semantic ascent or anaphoric devices. Whether this is a problem for the view is not clear.

9 Conclusion

None of the standard accounts of epistemic modals works very well. Contextualist accounts can’t make sense of retrospective assessments, retractions, and disagreement, no matter how much contextual flexibility they introduce; expressivist accounts flounder on some of the same data and require a Ptolemaic account of embedded uses of modals. Each view can be motivated by pointing to the shortcomings of the other, but neither is very satisfying in its own right.

Relativism looks like a promising alternative to these standard views. It seems to
explain all of the data that motivate the others views, but it can also handle the problem cases that they can’t handle.

Substantial problems remain. There are many difficult issues that arise in the compositional semantics—for example, concerning the interaction of epistemic modals with temporal modifiers—but these face all of the standard accounts as well. The special problems for the relativist are philosophical problems—for example, the problem of making sense of the assessment-relative truth predicate. Those have been kept off the table here. The present paper is an advertisement for their importance, not just for philosophers, but for natural language semanticists of all stripes.

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