The perspective shift of Korean evidentials and the effect of the context

Korean direct evidential -te- introduces the implication that the speaker has direct perceptive evidence regarding the eventuality denoted by the prejacent (the proposition abstracted from the context of the evidential marker): either the speaker directly perceived the eventuality denoted by the prejacent, or at least the speaker inferred the eventuality denoted by the prejacent from her direct perceptive evidence. However, when used in a question, as noted by many authors, including Lim (2010), Lee C. (2011) and Lee J. (2011), -te- introduces the implication that the addressee, rather than the speaker, is expected to have direct perceptive evidence regarding the prejacent, as in (1), which we call the perspective shift of -te-:

   John-Nom home-Loc go-Dir.evi-Decl ‘John went home’
   Implication: the speaker directly perceived (i.e. saw or heard) that John went home
b. John-i cip-ey ka-te-nya?
   John-Nom home-Loc go-Dir.evi-Q ‘Did John go home?’
   Implication: the addressee is expected to answer based on her direct perceptive evidence

Lim (2010) accounts for this puzzle by assuming that a question with evidentials is a set of characters rather than a set of propositions, and accordingly assuming that -te- is a function taking a proposition as its argument and returns a character (Kaplan 1989). However, he does not discuss another case of perspective shifts of -te-, that is, where -te- is used with the reportative evidential -lay- (see 2), which is observed by Lee C. (2011):

(2) (Scenario: Mary told the speaker that (she saw that) John went home)
   John-i cip-ey ka-te-lay.
   John-Nom home-Loc go-Dir.evi-Rep.evi ‘John went home’
   Implication: Mary, the source of the speaker’s reportative evidence, directly perceived that John went home

One might explain the case like (2) by assuming a verb of saying ha- and the declarative ending is phonologically contracted as -lay, and therefore analyzing (2) somewhat in parallel with (3):

(3) ??Mary-nun John-i cip-ey ka-te-la-ko ha-ess-e.
   Mary-Top John-i home-Loc go-Dir.evi-Decl-Comp say-Past-Decl
   (Intended) ‘Mary told that (she saw that) John went home’

However, as indicated in (3), -te- in the embedded sentence is not so acceptable (unlike what is reported in Lee J. 2011). Furthermore, unlike the verb of saying ha-, -lay in (2) cannot be the target of the negation. Therefore, the negation an in (4a) can only negate the prejacent, whereas an (4b) can negate the verb of saying. Both facts suggest to us that the implication introduced by -lay is different from that of the verb of saying, and that -lay is a grammaticalized ending introducing reportative evidentiality:

   John-Nom home-Loc Neg go-Dir.evi-Rep.evi ‘John did not go home’ (with evidential implication)
   May-Top John-Nom home-Loc go-Past-Decl-Comp Neg say-Past-Decl ‘Mary told that John went home’ (with evidential implication)

This said, in this paper we try to account for the perspective shift of -te- in the question like (1b) and in the case where -te- is used with another evidential like (2) in a unified way. To do so, we note that both in (1b) and (2) the utterer of the sentence is different from the asserter of the sentence (which can further be regarded as an evidence holder). First, given the rather standard
semantics of questions (Karttunen 1977, *i.a.*), a question denotes a set of answers, meaning that the entire question is uttered by the questioner, but the assertion is ‘delayed’ until the addressee picks up one of the answers as a true answer in the context. Similarly, the asserter of the proposition *that John went home* in (2) is different from the utterer of the sentence, who simply ‘delivers’ what she heard by uttering the sentence with the reportative evidential *-lay*.

Given this, similarly to McCready’s (2006) proposal, we propose that Korean evidentials introduce a kind of context-shifting operator (Anand and Nevins 2004), which only changes the asserter of the sentence to the evidence holder salient in the context. This can be formalized as (5), where OP is an operator introduced by an evidential marker (either direct or indirect), $\phi$ is the prejacent, $a$ is the asserter of $\phi$, and $e$ is the evidence holder salient in the context:

(5) \[ \text{Op} (\text{[[}\phi\text{]]}^{\text{de se}}) = \text{[[}\phi\text{]]}^{\text{e-de se}} \]

In the declarative like (1a), since the evidential marker is direct, the evidence holder is the asserter, which is also the utterer, hence no shift, even though the operator in (5) is introduced in (1a). In the question (1b), the contextually salient evidence holder can be the addressee, and therefore the operator can ‘overwrite’ the asserter of the answer as the addressee, and therefore, the addressee can be regarded as the evidence holder of each answer in the question. Finally, in cases like (2), the prejacent of *-lay* contains the direct evidential *-te-*, and then the asserter of the prejacent is ‘overwritten’ as the evidence holder, from whom the utterer of (2) has the reportative evidence.

This proposal, which adopts the notion of the context shifting operator, gives us a way to account for the puzzle regarding Korean *de se* anaphor *caki* pointed out by Lim (2011). According to him, when *-te-* is used, the long-distance *de se* anaphor *caki* can refer to the attitude holder even when the attitude holder does not have the relevant *de se* knowledge, such as in (6):

(6) \[(\text{Scenario: Bill and John are close friends to each other. Their children are also close friends to each other, and go to the same school. Once Bill and John were invited to the school. In the school, when both Bill and John were looking at a class in a distance, they saw one kid making troubles during a class. Later Bill came to Tom, the teacher, and told him to scold the kid who was making troubles in the class. However, John also found that, unbeknownst to Bill, the kid was actually Bill’s Son. Later John said…})\]

Bill, -i Tom-eykey caki, atul-ul honnay-la-ko ha-te-la.
Bill-Nom Tom-Dat self son-Acc scold-Comp say-Dir.evi-Decl
(intended) ‘Bill, told Tom to scold self, ’s son’ (with evidential implication)

This can be accounted for if we regard Bill as the asserter of the embedded sentence, and *-te-* ‘overwrites’ the asserter of the embedded proposition with the evidence holder, who is John the speaker. Since John actually has the relevant knowledge regarding the relation between Bill and *caki*, and by the operator introduced by *-te-* John can be regarded as the asserter of the embedded proposition, we can assume that the relevant *de se* knowledge is provided by the evidence holder (the utterer), and therefore *caki* is licensed.