

ical statements and observable entities in the world, then facts are not qualified for this latter role. Objects and processes might be, but then I do not know how to formulate the theory. Fortunately, this is not my task in this chapter. But what about the principle, "A statement is true if it fits or corresponds to the facts"? Does it not suggest a relation between statements and the world? It cannot and it does not. First of all, notice that we do not say, in the singular, that a true statement fits a fact. We say, in the plural, that a true statement fits the facts. This can only mean that it is consistent with and is in harmony with the facts known or knowable that are relevant to a given case. It is like saying that a theory fits the data. And, since we know that facts can be stated and denied, it is not surprising to find that they can be consistent with, entail or be entailed by, statements, results, other facts, and so on. Needless to add that consistency and entailment are not relations affecting observable things in the world. The maxim "True statements fit the facts" has nothing to do with the correspondence theory of truth.

## [6]

Effects, Results,  
and Consequences<sup>1</sup>

6.1. It is well-known in theory, though often not sufficiently realized in practice, that some key terms of philosophical discourse lead a double life. We understand and use them in our daily intercourse, and we claim we understand them as they occur in the writings of philosophers, in spite of the fact that the conditions of their use in these two cases are contextually or even grammatically different. This of course means that we are really dealing with more

<sup>1</sup> This topic was originally suggested to me by the late J. L. Austin in 1955. The present chapter is a somewhat enlarged combination of two papers that appeared in *Analytical Philosophy* (ed. R. J. Butler) "Effects, Results and Consequences" (pp. 1-15) and "Reactions and Retractions" (pp. 25-31). In trying to improve the originals I was greatly helped by the comments of Professors S. Bromberger, W. H. Dray (published in the same volume), and Ruth Barcan Marcus. I was also impressed by the excellent discussion of the original papers by Professor J. M. Shorter entitled "Causality and a Method of Analysis" in *Analytical Philosophy*, second series (ed. R. J. Butler).