

end. They are in a place, but they do not take place at a certain time. They do not even last except with respect to wear. To say that a tree began twenty years ago, lasted for ten years, and then ended is to talk philosophical nonsense. Yet, for sure, they may exist for a length of time. But then it is their existence, or life, that lasts that long. Prepositions tell the same story. Although we might speak of times before Socrates or after Christ, what we mean is something like before or after their birth or public life. This is enough to show that the relation of objects (or persons) to time is different from that of events, actions, or processes; it is an indirect relation.

Events and their kin are primarily temporal entities. A quick glance at the relevant verb class, together with a consideration of adjectives like *fast*, *slow*, *sudden*, *prolonged*, and *gradual*, prepositions like *before*, *after*, and *since*, are enough to convince us. Are they in space? Not directly. The collapse of the Germans is not located, nor can it be found anywhere. Yet it makes sense to say that it took place both in the *Vaterland* and in occupied Europe. Yet to continue by saying that the collapse of the Germans was 2,000 miles long would be absurd. Yes, the collapse may have occurred all along a 2,000-mile front, but this precisely shows the indirect relation that events have to space.

Now facts (and their kin, like results) are not in space and time at all. They are not located, cannot move, split, or spread, and they do not occur, take place, or last in any sense. Nor can they be vast or fast. Sentences like

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is just a journalistic transform of

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5.13. Finally, what about the world? Is it something like an object, or something like a process, or something like a fact? Well, what can we say of the world? Surely, it is large and wide. We are *in* it and some things in it are closer to us than others; we speak of *this part* of the world. True, the world cannot move and is not somewhere, but this should not disturb us in view of the relativity of these concepts. It seems, then, that the world is very much like an object; more exactly, the idea of the world is the limiting idea of the totality of all objects. Objects are parts of the world, somewhat as organs are parts of an organism. Then, surely, objects are in the world in a very straightforward sense.

Yet the coin has another side. It is possible to speak of the beginning or the end of the world. We even say that in spite of John's death the world goes on as before. If, therefore, the world is also a process, then other processes may be in it as parts: much the same way as the writing of this chapter is a part of my life. But even this process aspect of the world aside, all processes, actions, and events take place *in* the world in the indirect sense I mentioned above.

But how can facts possibly be in the world? When they cannot even be in more familiar receptacles like rooms or continents? Certainly facts are *about* things in the world, but this *about* is not the *about* of *she is working about the house all day*. It is the *about* of *talking about something*. I do not find any justification for the claim that facts are in the world.

This brings us back to the correspondence theory, Austin's demonstrative and descriptive conventions, and the maxim, "A statement is true if it fits the facts."¹⁰ If the correspondence theory requires a relation between empir-

¹⁰ "Truth," *Philosophical Papers*, pp. 85-101.