

To summarize, we have defined, on purely syntactical grounds, two families of nominals, imperfect and perfect. We found that container contexts clearly discriminate among them—to such an extent, in fact, that in dubious cases the quality of the container sentence decides the affiliation of the nominal in question.

5.11. It is time to return to Austin's example: *the collapse of the Germans*. This phrase, in itself, presents a dubious case, in spite of having the form of a perfect nominal. Nobody would object to the sentences:

The collapse of the Germans is a fact.

The collapse of the Germans was an event.

But we know that the contexts in which the nominal, *the collapse of the Germans*, occurs in these sentences determine an entirely different set of paraphrases and possible co-occurrences for each; in other words, the senses in which the nominal is taken in these two cases are categorically different. As it by no means follows that since the collapse was a gradual or bloody event, the fact of that collapse has to be gradual or bloody, and as it by no means follows that since the fact of that collapse has been denied or contradicted, any event has to be denied or contradicted, so it is equally absurd to conclude that since the collapse of the Germans was an event that took place in the world, any fact has to take place or simply be in the world. Austin's syllogism has four terms.

5.12. If catching Austin napping on one occasion were the only result we could show for our prolonged labors, we could justly be accused of shooting pigeons with elephant guns, or, shall I say, batteries. No, our final quarry is

of far nobler breed. Hence a metaphysical cauda to the linguistic tale.

What is in the world? More specifically, are there only objects in the world, or also events, actions, and processes, or perhaps even facts? The reason for this threefold distinction is obvious by now: it simply mirrors the subdivision of noun phrases into object nouns and the two kinds of nominal we have discussed. I do not think that the question just posed is philosophical nonsense. It cannot be, since I am going to answer it in what I hope is a sensible way.

We have talked enough, directly and indirectly, about facts and events. To be able to answer the question, we will have to add some very obvious points about objects, and discuss a few perhaps less obvious points about the concept of the world, particularly with respect to the phrase *being in the world*.

As for the concept of an object, I once more follow the procedure of asking what sorts of adjectives and verbs are available in talking about objects. In doing this, I have to be selective: I choose those that are relevant to the present topic. And, since we are aware of the linguistic background, I shall avail myself of the comforts of the material mode. So I draw attention to the fact that objects have sizes and shapes, one can touch them, look at them, and see them from various angles and distances. Moreover we can push and pull them, cut them or tear them apart. This is possible because they are located at a certain place, they are somewhere. And they can change place by moving, rolling, or walking, by rising or falling. They can, in addition, contain other objects as boxes do cigars. All this and many other features can be summarized by repeating the trivial truth: objects are in space. Are they in time too? The answer is not easy. Objects do not occur, begin, or